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Abstract 
Countries sign bilateral double tax treaties (DTTs) to avoid or mitigate double 
taxation in cross border economic activity. It is hardly possible to ignore the 
effect of double taxation in the era of globalization. DTTs are signed between 
two countries to allocate tax jurisdiction between them and to avoid tax disputes 
between the taxpayer and the country concerned. Nonetheless, tax disputes crop 
up since such treaties may be open to interpretation at the time of 
implementation. Hence, DTTs contain tax dispute resolution mechanism. The 
widely recognized dispute resolution mechanisms are the mutual agreement 
procedure (MAP) –a kind of negotiation between the two contracting states– and 
compulsory arbitration. However, the aptness and efficacy of these tax dispute 
resolution mechanisms have been seriously questioned particularly from the 
vantage point of developing countries such as Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia has 
signed several DTTs with a view to attracting FDI, no study has been made 
which sheds some light on the essence and operation of the MAP in the DTTs. 
This note aims at exploring the tax dispute resolution mechanisms incorporated in 
DTTs since such mechanisms have implication for developing countries 
including Ethiopia.  
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NOTE 




The era of globalization is accompanied by cross-border economic activities. 1 
These activities have entailed various issues of international double taxation 
since there are conflicts of jurisdiction of taxation of sovereign states. Countries 
cannot ignore the problem of international double taxation, and in effect, they 
have been taking unilateral and bilateral measures which are meant to mitigate 
or avoid international double taxation. In unilateral measures, countries make 
use of exemption, deduction or foreign tax crediting as the case may be. The 
most important bilateral measures in response to the problem of international 
double taxation are double tax avoidance treaties otherwise called bilateral tax 
treaties.  
Despite the presence of double tax avoidance treaties, international tax 
disputes have been common. There have been attempts internationally to put in 
place tax dispute resolution mechanisms because international tax disputes are 
important manifestations of international taxation. As the international tax 
dispute resolution system has an impact on developing countries such as 
Ethiopia, this note discusses international tax dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The author tries to examine whether there is adequate international tax dispute 
resolution system and to highlight the implication in developing countries. To 
this end, this note addresses four basic themes, i.e., the features international 
taxation, international double taxation and how can it be remedied, resolution of 
international tax disputes, and the implication of the international tax dispute 
resolution system to developing countries such as Ethiopia.  
Under the first section, few points regarding globalization and taxation are 
discussed. The second section deals with some basic points on the causes and 
remedies of international double taxation. Sections 3 and 4 respectively deal 
with the international tax dispute resolution system – which involves the mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) – and arbitration. The fifth section discusses the 
implication of tax dispute resolution mechanisms for developing countries such 
as Ethiopia followed by brief concluding remarks.   
                                           
Frequentl used acronyms: 
DTTs Bilateral double tax treaties 




Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Model Tax Conventions 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
1 See Muhammad Akram Ch., Muhammad Asim Faheem, Muhammad Khyzer Bin Dost  
and Iqra Abdullah (2011), ‘Globalization and its Impacts on the World Economic 
Development’, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2 No. 23, 
Special Issue, December 2011. 
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1. Globalization and International Taxation: An Overview  
As noted in various literature, the world has experienced two globalization 
booms. The first boom began as of 1820s which lasted until the outbreak of the 
First World War while the second boom began following the conclusion of the 
Second World War which has continued to date.2 The phenomenon of 
globalization at the end of the 20th century and at the dawn of the 21st century is 
the outcome of two important international developments. The first factor is the 
general removal of exchange controls by developed countries while the second 
relates to the growth of new technologies particularly computer-based data 
processing and communications such as the Internet.3 These data processing and 
communication technologies have made global communication virtually 
instantaneous. These developments have made worldwide swift financial 
transactions possible resulting in highly mobile financial capital in an 
unprecedented manner. Global communication has also enabled transnational 
corporations (TNCs) to make very quick decisions on a global basis.4  
Needless to say, globalization has produced various economic and non-
economic effects. One of the most important effects of globalization is 
international taxation which basically pertains to the question as to how to 
divide the international tax base in the absence of a higher authority since 
globalization has increased mobility of capital. 5 
According to Mitchell A. Kane, international taxation is composed of both 
unilateral domestic law and treaty law on the taxation of transactions that fall 
within the taxing jurisdiction of more than one sovereign state.6 International 
taxation is anchored on two fundamental principles. These principles are the 
residence principle and the source principle. In the residence principle, “the 
place of residency of the taxpayer is taken as the basis of assessment of tax 
                                           
2 See J. G. Williamson (1992), ‘Winners and Losers over TWO Centuries of Globalization,’ 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 9161, available at 
www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/.../williamson%202002%20winners%20losers.pdf, 
accessed on December 13, 2017. 
3 See generally Roxana Ian (2012), ‘Limits to Globalization: Some Implications for 
Taxation, Tax Policy and the Developing World,’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Paper Series, 3/2012. Law Department, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, UK, p.4. 
4 Ibid 
5 Eduardo Baistrocchi (2008), The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging 
World: Theory and Implications, Reprinted from British Tax Review Issue 4, Sweet & 
Maxwell Limited, 100 Avenue Road, Swiss Cottage, London, NW3 3PF, p. 4. 
6 Mitchell A. Kane (2015), ‘A Defense of Source Principle in International Taxation’, 32 
Yale Journal on Regulation, p. 312.  
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liabilities”.7 On the other hand, the source principle gives attention to the source 
of the income as the basis for assessing tax liability. According to the former 
principle, residents of a country are required to pay tax uniformly on their 
worldwide income irrespective of the country where that income is generated. 
According to the source principle, on the other hand, income derived in the 
home country is uniformly taxed in disregard of the residency of the recipient of 
the income.8 Countries have adopted the mixture of these two principles of 
international taxation with a view to maximizing their tax revenues. However, 
the combined application of these two principles inevitably results in 
international double taxation.9 
2. International Double Taxation: An Overview of Causes and 
Remedies 
International double taxation refers to the levying of taxes on the same income 
or capital of the same taxpayer in the same period by two or more 
jurisdictions.10 International double taxation manifests itself in different forms 
occurring in various situations. Generally, international double taxation is 
classified into juridical double taxation and economic double taxation. In the 
case of juridical double taxation, the same income is being taxed twice in the 
hands of the same taxpayer while economic double taxation refers to the 
situation where the same income is being taxed twice in the hands of two 
different taxpayers.11 International double taxation is attributable to three basic 
reasons, i.e., (i) residence-residence conflict, (ii) source-source conflict, and (iii) 
source-residence conflict. 
Residence-residence conflict:  
Two states may tax the same person (an individual or a company) on his/her/its 
worldwide income or capital owing to inconsistent definitions of residence. For 
example, a company may be considered as resident of state X because the 
company was incorporated in state X, while state Y may consider it as its 
                                           
7 Jacob Frenkel, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, ‘Basic Concepts of International Taxation’, 
NBER Working Papers Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, December, 1990, 
available at www.nber.org/papers/w3540.pdf, accessed on December 15, 2017.pp. 2-3.  
8 Ibid  
9 Ibid 
10 See Paul L. Baker (2012), An analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on 
Foreign Direct Investment, University of Cambridge, p. 2. 
11 See Introduction to International Double taxation and Tax Evasion and Avoidance; 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Seventh Session, 
Geneva 24-28, October 2011, available at 
www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/seventhsession/CRP11_Introduction_2011.pdf, accessed on 
December 15, 2017, p. 12. 
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resident based on the company’s operations and effective management in state 
Y. As a result, the income of such company is exposed to international double 
taxation.12  
Source-source conflict  
Such conflict is also a source of international double taxation. This is because 
two states may claim power to tax the same income owing to conflicts in the 
way the source of income is determined under their domestic legislation.13  
Source-residence conflict 
A state may claim that it has the power to tax a certain income invoking the 
residence principle while the other state claims the power to tax using the source 
principle. For instance, company A is incorporated in state X while it is 
generating its income in state Y. In this case, state X claims the power to tax on 
the basis of the residence principle, and state X claims the power to tax using the 
source principle. Therefore, company A is exposed to double taxation.14  
Although international double taxation cannot be avoided from the very 
outset, there are remedies that can be utilized to mitigate or eliminate 
international double taxation. The discussion on the remedies would indeed 
benefit from prior attention to the reasons that dictate countries to address the 
problem of international double taxation. 
 International double taxation should be mitigated or avoided as far as 
possible because it is a serious obstacle for the movement of capital, goods and 
services. It also affects the cooperation and financial relations between 
countries. International double taxation affects import and export neutrality of 
capital, distorts efficient allocation of scarce economic resource internationally, 
affects the fairness of a given tax system and it is a cause for international tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning; it is also an obstacle to the 
development of economic relations between states reducing the revenue of 
international operators and their interests in making investments abroad.15 
With a view to addressing these adverse effects, methods of mitigating or 
eliminating international double taxation have been designed and put into 
practice. The methods are generally classified into two basic categories. These 
are: unilateral remedies and bilateral remedies. Unilateral remedies are provided 
by an individual country using its own domestic tax legislation since it is not 
                                           
12 Id, p.13. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Nicoleta Barbuta and Florin Tudor, The International Double Taxation: Causes and 
Avoidance, available at 
www.academia.edu/.../The_International_Double_Taxation_causes_and_avoidance, 
accessed on January 5, 2018, p. 1.  
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easy to ignore international double taxation. In this regard, there are three major 
mechanisms put in place by various countries. These are: tax exemption, foreign 
tax crediting, and deduction for foreign taxes paid.  
With regard to the first method, if a country has provided in its domestic tax 
legislation that it exempts income from a specified economic activity that is not, 
for example, produced within its territory, international double taxation is 
eliminated. If the exemption method is accepted, no further mechanism is 
necessary to eliminate or mitigate double taxation.16  
The second unilateral method of reducing the burden of international double 
taxation is the foreign tax credit method. The essential feature of this method is 
that the resident state treats a foreign income tax paid to the source state by its 
residents as though it were paid to itself.17 The operation of foreign tax 
crediting, as a method of mitigating double taxation, depends on the tax rates 
prevailing both in the source country and the country of residence. Hence, where 
the foreign tax rate is lower than the domestic tax rate, only the excess of the 
domestic tax over the foreign tax is payable to the residence state. However, no 
tax is payable to the residence state where the foreign tax rate is equal or higher 
than the tax rate prevailing in the country of residence.18 
The third unilateral mechanism of minimizing the burden of international 
double taxation is the deduction method. Under this method, it is merely the 
burden of double taxation that is reduced, rather than eliminating double 
taxation. This is contrary to the exemption and foreign tax crediting methods.19 
 Despite the prevalence of the above mentioned unilateral methods of dealing 
with international double taxation, bilateral methods through bilateral tax 
treaties are commonly practised. Bilateral tax treaties aim at effectively breaking 
down the barriers of international trade by eliminating double taxation and 
prevention of fiscal evasion.20 The majority of the bilateral tax treaties are 
                                           
16 See Yoseph Edrey and Adrienne Jeffrey (1991), ‘Taxation of International Activity: Over 
Relief from Double Taxation under the US Tax System’, 9 International Taxes and 
Business Law, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Issue No. 1, pp. 106-107. 
17 See Introduction to International Double Taxation and Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Seventh session 
Geneva, 24-28 October 2011, available at 
www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/seventhsession/CRP11_Introduction_2011.pdf, accessed on 20 
December 2017, p.18. 
18 Ibid 
19 Yoseph Edrey and Adrienne Jeffrey cited above at note 17, P.111.  
20 See OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Commentary, 
Condensed Version, 15 July 2014, available at 
www.law.uh.edu/faculty/wstreng/InternationalTax2015/OECDModelTreaty-2014.pdf, 
accessed on December 5, 2017, p.7. 
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negotiated based on two international model tax conventions (MTCs). These are 
the OECD model and the UN model double tax treaties.21 Going through the 
model tax conventions and bilateral tax treaties, we can observe two methods of 
avoidance of international double taxation, i.e., the exemption method and the 
foreign tax credit method.22  
3. The Mutual Agreement Procedure in Tax Dispute Resolution  
International tax disputes are common despite the presence of domestic tax laws 
and bilateral tax treaties. Brauner notes that “the grand illusory of a single, 
worldwide tax system that would eliminate all international inefficiencies and 
assist all nations of the world in maximizing their relative advantage is 
commonly accepted as utopia”.23 Thus the causes of international tax disputes 
that emanate from bilateral tax treaties and the methods of resolving such 
disputes have been issues of academic discourse. The discussion in this section 
covers mutual agreement procedure (MAP). International tax dispute arbitration 
and the implication of the international dispute resolution system for developing 
countries are respectively highlighted in Sections 4 and 5.  
3.1 The function, operation and outcomes of the MAP  
The Mutual Agreement Procedure has been an essential element of bilateral 
treaties. It is based on the OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions (MTCs). 
Art. 25(1) of the two Model Tax Conventions is a crucial procedural provision 
regarding the application and implementation of bilateral treaties. It provides for 
the establishment of an international tax dispute resolution procedure called a 
‘Mutual Agreement Procedure’ (hereinafter the MAP). This procedure enables 
the contracting parties to apply the substantive provisions contained in bilateral 
tax treaties which allocate taxing rights between contracting states.24 Art. 25 of 
both models, entrust the power –to administer the MAP– to the competent 
authorities that are envisaged under Art. 3(e) of the Model conventions. They 
are the organs normally responsible for the administration of the tax treaties.25  
                                           
21 See the two models and compare them with bilateral tax treaties. 
22 Ibid 
23 Yariv Brauner (2003), ‘An International Tax Regime in Crystallization’, 56 Tax Law 
Review, 259, p.1. 
24 Hugh Ault (2013), ‘Dispute Resolution: The Mutual Agreement Procedure,’ in Alexander 
Trepelkov, Harry Tonino and Dominika Halka,(eds.) , United Nations Handbook on 
Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
United Nations, New York, p.309. 
25 In bilateral tax treaties signed between Ethiopia and various countries, it has been 
stipulated that the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation is the 
competent authority.  
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According to Art. 25(2) of the MTCs, the role of the competent authorities is 
to “endeavor to resolve” by mutual agreement difficulties or doubts emanating 
from the application of the treaties. With a view to ensuring the proper 
functioning of the tax authorities, Art. 25 has given taxpayers the right to 
request the competent authority to adjust their tax liabilities in accordance with 
the tax treaty when they (the taxpayers) believe that they are not taxed in 
accordance with the substantive rules of the treaty. 
Cases initiated by taxpayers represent a significant portion of the cases 
submitted for the MAP.26 The cases arise in relation to various issues such as 
transfer pricing disputes,27  allocation of profits under Article 728 of the Model 
Conventions, and the existence of permanent establishment or the appropriate 
residence of an individual or a company.29 In addition to initiation by taxpayers, 
the competent authorities may also initiate cases to resolve doubts and 
uncertainties concerning the application of the treaty. They can do this by 
formulating –an agreed-upon– meaning to a term which is not defined in the 
treaty with the purpose of ensuring uniform and consistent application. 
Moreover, the competent authorities are allowed to conduct mutual 
consultations towards the avoidance of double taxation where it is not regulated 
in the treaty.30 
Article 25(4) of the Model Tax Conventions authorizes the competent 
authorities to communicate in writing or through oral communication. It is 
meant to avoid cumbersome formal rules usually employed in 
intergovernmental communications. This informal mode of communication 
gives the competent authorities the opportunity to make efficient 
communication through face-to-face meetings, exchange of documents or 
position papers and other forms of informal contacts.31 Art. 25(4) envisages the 
possibility of developing bilateral procedures by the competent authorities to 
deal with various detailed questions which are crucial for the implementation of 
the MAP. 
The outcome of the MAP depends on who has initiated it. Where the MAP is 
initiated by the taxpayer, the normal result is an agreement between the 
competent authorities regarding the way the treaty is applied in the taxpayer’s 
case. In such cases, both competent authorities apply the same interpretation of 
                                           
26 Ault, cited above at note 29, p. 310. 
27 To have a clear picture of cases involving transfer pricing disputes and how such disputes 
are resolved through the MAP, see Yitzhak Hadari (1998), ‘Resolution of International 
Transfer Pricing Disputes’, Canadian Revenue Journal, Vol. 46, No.  
28 The provision deals with the allocation of business profits between the contracting parties. 
29 Ault, cited above at note 29, p. 310. 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
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the treaty, 32 and the taxpayer is free to accept or reject the outcome of the MAP. 
A taxpayer who accepts the outcome of the MAP is compelled to give up 
domestic remedies in the two jurisdictions. On the contrary, the taxpayer has the 
right to seek relief from the judiciary or an administrative tribunal where he 
rejects the outcome of the MAP. The MAP procedure initiated by the competent 
authority results in the publication of some other sort of advice which indicates 
how the two states will apply the treaty.33  
3.2 The nexus between MAP and domestic remedies 
A close reading of Art. 25 of the Model Tax Conventions indicates that the 
presence of the MAP cannot oust the normal domestic legal remedies available 
to a taxpayer. It is thus important to inquire into the exact relation between the 
two systems of relief. If a taxpayer submits his grievance to a domestic 
court/administrative tribunal and such court or tribunal renders decision, the 
competent authority may be bound by the decision and may not be in a position 
to give a unilateral relief.  
Where resort to domestic relief and the MAP are available to the taxpayer, it 
is imperative to have rules which establish the relation between the two systems. 
That is why there can be cases where states demand the taxpayer to waive all his 
rights under domestic law before the acceptance of the case by the competent 
authorities for MAP.34 This is meant to address concerns against ultimate 
rejection by a taxpayer after resources and efforts are devoted to find a solution 
through the MAP. However, this approach of the state is not usual. Rather, more 
commonly, states require the taxpayer to suspend the active pursuit of his 
domestic law remedies while the MAP case is being implemented. In such 
circumstances, it is advisable to the taxpayer to take the necessary steps –as 
required under domestic law– to maintain the domestic law remedies available 
in case the MAP fails to produce a result which is satisfactory to the taxpayer.35  
3. 3 MAP initiated by the taxpayer: basic requirements 
A taxpayer can initiate the MAP where he meets the basic requirements. The 
first basic requirement is residence. According to Art. 25(1) of the two Model 
Tax Conventions, a taxpayer is allowed to initiate the MAP provided that 
he/she/it is a resident of one of the contracting parties. Secondly, the taxpayer 
has to establish that an action by one or both of the contracting states results in 
or will result in taxation contrary to the tax treaty.36 The request is to be made to 
the state of which the taxpayer is resident although his claim relates to taxation 
                                           
32 See Art. 25 of both Model Tax Conventions. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ault, cited above at note 30, p.310.  
35 Id., p. 311.  
36 Ibid. 
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imposed by the other state. A taxpayer has the right to initiate the MAP if the 
action of one or both of the contracting states has the potential to bring about 
taxation inconsistent with the treaty.  It is to be noted that it is not a requirement 
that the taxpayer has already been charged tax.37 
The taxpayer who requests the MAP should provide necessary information to 
the competent authorities for the MAP to be successful. In this regard, some 
countries have developed a formal procedure which should be followed by the 
taxpayer when he makes MAP requests.38 If the taxpayer fails to discharge his 
duty of providing information, it is justified for the competent authority to 
suspend the MAP request or to reject the request altogether.  
The third basic requirement is payment. Article 25 of both Model 
Conventions do not require the taxpayer to pay the tax before initiating the 
MAP. However, there are international practices where states require taxpayers 
to pay the assessed tax liability before the beginning of the MAP. Such 
requirement has to be considered very seriously because it would not be in line 
with the basic purposes of the MAP since it requires the advance payment of the 
disputed tax obligation. Even where the tax paid in advance is ultimately 
refunded to a taxpayer whose claim prevails, the taxpayer will suffer from the 
loss of time value of money (TVM) in relation to the payment.39  
The fourth basic requirement is time limit that should be met by the taxpayer 
who initiates the MAP. Art 25(1) of both Model Conventions provides that the 
taxpayer must present the case for MAP relief within three years of the first 
notification of the action taken by one of the states which has resulted in or will 
result in taxation not in accordance with the treaty. The purpose of this 
requirement is to protect the competent authorities from late-filed objections to 
the application of the treaty rules.  
However, it is to be noted that the three years period provided in the Model 
Tax Conventions is a recommendation. Contracting states are thus free to 
determine a shorter or longer period. What exactly constitutes ‘notification’ for 
the purpose of establishing the period in which the taxpayer can present a claim 
is very crucial, and it has been clarified in the commentaries to the Model 
Conventions. According to these commentaries, notification is generally 
manifested by the act of taxation itself, the payment of an amount which is 
                                           
37 Ibid. 
38 These authorities generally have developed the procedure having in mind the United 
Nations Guide to the MAP. In this regard, See United Nations Guide to the Map, 
paragraph 74, available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/gmap/Guide_MAP.pdf, accessed on 
January 6, 2018. 
39Ault, cited above at note 29, p. 316. 
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subject to a withholding tax or the actual issuance of a tax assessment notice or 
official demands for collection.40 
3.4 Evaluation of the MAP request, unilateral resolution by a state, and 
bilateral negotiations  
When the taxpayer submits to the competent authority a MAP request by 
fulfilling the afore-mentioned requirements, the latter is duty-bound to 
determine if the objection appears to be justified.41 Art. 25(2) of both Model Tax 
Conventions seems to have given a wide discretion to the competent authority of 
the residence country. Scholars argue that the best practice is to be liberal in 
granting MAP requests.42 In some cases, there may be domestic law which is an 
impediment to accepting the case. Some states refuse to accept the MAP request 
where they believe that the transaction in question has been found to be abusive. 
Nonetheless, the commentaries to the Model Tax Conventions indicate that 
generally there should not be denial to the MAP request.43  
On the other hand, where there are violations of domestic law which involve 
significant penalties, some states may decline from accepting the MAP request. 
As clearly provided under Art. 25 of the two Model Tax Conventions, a 
residence country to which a MAP request is submitted should first attempt to 
resolve the case unilaterally. It may do this, for instance, by granting tax credit 
or giving an exemption. If the country is not in a position to resolve the case 
unilaterally, its competent authority then contacts the competent authority of the 
partner state to commence bilateral negotiations.44  
If unilateral resolution of the case is not possible, the first step in the bilateral 
MAP is for the residence state to develop a position paper which provides 
detailed statement of its views on the case. The position paper is expected to 
contain the name, address and TIN (Tax Identification Number) of the taxpayer, 
contact information regarding the competent authority’s officials in charge of 
the MAP case, a summary of the issues, the relevant facts and the basis for the 
tax administration action that is the subject of the MAP request, the taxation 
                                           
40 See the UN MTC commentary, p.376. 
41 See Art. 25(2) of both Model Tax Conventions. 
42 See Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP), Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration, OECD, 2007version, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/38061910.pdf, accessed on January 23, 2018. 
43 See paragraph 26 of the Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention and 
paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Article 25 of the United Nations Model Convention, 
quoting paragraph 26 of the Commentary on 
    Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention. 
44 Ibid 
506                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3                            December 2019 
 
 
years or periods involved, the amount of income and the relevant tax for each 
taxable period involved.45  
The other state may find it useful to provide rebuttal or response upon the 
receipt of the initial position paper from the competent authority of the residence 
state. The response is expected to indicate whether a view, resolution or 
proposed relief presented in the initial position paper can be accepted, an 
indication of the areas of issues where the competent authorities are in 
agreement or disagreement, requests for any required additional information or 
clarification, other additional information deemed relevant to the case but not 
presented in the initial position paper and alternative reasoned proposals for 
resolution.46 After this exchange of views, the competent authorities will 
continue their discussion towards final resolution. If no agreement is reached, 
the case may be submitted to arbitration if the countries have adopted mandatory 
arbitration as provided in alternative B of Art. 25 of the UN Model Tax 
Convention or Art. 25(5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
3.5 Participation of the taxpayer in the MAP process 
Once the taxpayer has made a MAP request, the MAP is a government-to-
government relationship since the taxpayer has no direct standing in the case.47 
Yet, a successful MAP requires close cooperation between the taxpayer and the 
competent authorities. This cooperation is useful because the taxpayer provides 
information to the competent authority in its state of residence. The competent 
authority of the country of residence can in turn communicate the information to 
the competent authority of the other state. The need to request further 
information may be felt by the competent authorities. The taxpayer may also be 
requested to provide clarification on points which are not clear to the competent 
authorities. The competent authorities have the power to permit the taxpayer to 
submit briefs or make presentations to either one or both of them. However, 
direct participation of the taxpayer in the negotiation of the competent 
authorities is not appropriate given the differing interests of the parties.48   
3.6 Implementation of the MAP Result 
If the MAP negotiations successfully end up in an agreement on the appropriate 
interpretation and application of the treaty in the case, some steps need to be 
taken for the implementation of the MAP agreement. To begin with, the MAP 
outcome has to be accepted by the taxpayer since it is not binding on the 
                                           
45 See UN Guide to the MAP, cited above at note 42, paragraph 170. 
46 Id, paragraph 173. 
47 See Limor Riza (2014), “Taxpayers’ Lack of Standing in International Tax Dispute 
Resolutions: An Analysis Based on the Hybrid Norms of International Taxation”, Pace 
Law Review, Volume 34, Issue 3.  
48 The UN Guide to the MAP, cited above at note 42, paragraphs 149-154. 
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taxpayer. In fact, the legal status of the agreement and the actual steps necessary 
for its implementation depend on the prevailing normal procedures in the two 
countries. According to Art. 25(2) of both Model Conventions, a MAP 
agreement shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits of domestic 
law. This obligation may require changes in the domestic limitations rules to 
provide specific exceptions for adjustments arising under the agreement.  
3.7 Merits and demerits of the MAP: An overview 
Although MAP is not compulsory and binding, it is claimed that it is 
advantageous both to the governments concerned and the taxpayer. It is argued 
that the MAP protects state sovereignty because competent authorities have 
meaningful control over the application of the treaty. The competent authorities 
have the freedom to interpret the rules to their benefit. Countries rely on MAP 
as their sole authority. MAP is also appreciable because it provides for a process 
of finding an agreeable solution to existing dispute.49 Since MAP is a process 
involving negotiation between the competent authorities which “endeavor to 
resolve the dispute,” it is not detrimental to established international relations 
between jurisdictions.50  
MAP is applauded because it is not expensive and imposes little or no 
administrative burden especially when it is compared with various domestic and 
international litigation procedures.51 It is argued that the MAP is advantageous 
to taxpayers as well. For instance, as the taxpayer is not involved in the MAP 
process, he/she/it does not incur cost. The other advantage to taxpayers is that 
because the process is based on negotiation, both competent authorities will 
implement the decision due to their involvement and full participation in the 
course of reaching the decision.52 Furthermore, the MAP is advantageous to the 
taxpayer since the additional time provided to the taxpayer, whilst the competent 
authorities negotiate, gives him a tactical edge to consider any future resource.53 
The main disadvantage of MAP is that no result may be obtained since the 
outcome is determined by the free will of the contracting states. The other 
disadvantages of MAP are the uncertainty it entails, absence of transparency, 
and lack of legal obligation on the part of competent authorities to provide a 
solution due to which the problem faced by the taxpayer will remain unresolved 
                                           
49 Z.M. Altman (2005), Dispute Resolution under Tax Treaties, IBFD Doctoral Series,  p. 
253 
50 Hugh Ault, Dispute Resolution: the Mutual Agreement Procedure, Papers on Selected 
Topics in Administration of Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 2013, available at 
<www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2013TMTTAN/Paper8A_Ault.pdf>, accessed on December 28, 
2017, p.3. 
51 Altman, cited above at note 49, p.  254. 
52 Id, p. 266. 
53 Ibid 
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even after the initiation of MAP. Because MAP may not result in the resolution 
of the dispute, costs incurred by the competent authorities in the course of 
conducting the negotiation, and the time and energy can fail to bring about 
useful outcomes.54 The other disadvantage of MAP is that the aggrieved 
taxpayer is totally excluded from the MAP putting him at the mercy of the 
competent authorities although their decision ultimately affects the taxpayer.55 
4. Arbitration of International Tax Disputes  
The OECD committee on fiscal affairs made an extensive review of the possible 
use of arbitration to settle international tax disputes in 1984. However, it 
concluded that compulsory arbitration was not recommendable because it 
believed that compulsory arbitration would contravene state sovereignty.56 In 
1995, the OECD reopened the investigation into a more structured approach for 
the resolution of international tax disputes. The purpose was to critically analyse 
whether the introduction of a tax arbitration process would be an appropriate 
addition to the international tax dispute resolution system.57 The OECD found it 
necessary to supplement the MAP as it was considered as an inefficient 
international tax dispute resolution.58 Accordingly, the OECD added paragraph 
559 to Art. 25 which introduced the practice of mandatory arbitration. 60 It allows 
                                           
54 Id, p. 259.   
55 See Limor Riza, cited above at note 51.  
56 Ehab Farah (2009), ‘Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem’, Florida Tax Review, Vol.9, No.8, p.7. 
57Altman, cited above at note 49, p. 65. 
58 Ibid 
59 This paragraph reads: where: 
(a) under paragraph 1, a person has presented a case to the competent authority of a 
Contracting State on the basis that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States 
have resulted for that person in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, and (b) the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement to resolve 
that case pursuant to paragraph 2 within two years from the presentation of the case to the 
competent authority of the other Contracting State, any unresolved issues arising from the 
case shall be submitted to arbitration if either competent authority so requests. The person 
who has presented the case shall be notified of the request. These unresolved issues shall 
not, however, be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been 
rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of either State. The arbitration decision shall 
be binding on both States and shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the 
domestic laws of these States unless both competent authorities agree on a different 
solution within six months after the decision has been communicated to them or unless a 
person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that implements 
the arbitration decision. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by 
mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this paragraph. 
60 The UN Model Tax Convention has also provided the same paragraph under alternative B 
of Art.25. 
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the taxpayer to initiate an arbitration process if the MAP fails after two years 
from the date of its commencement. It is to be noted that the taxpayer is allowed 
to invoke arbitration only when the competent authority has initiated a MAP and 
the tax dispute has not been resolved by the negotiation of the competent 
authorities.  
If an agreement is reached by the tax authorities that is not to the satisfaction 
of the taxpayer, the latter does not have the right to take his case to arbitration. 
In other words, the arbitration process can only be invoked by the taxpayer for 
deadlocks and for cases which have been initially justified by the competent 
authority. Consequently, arbitration is not applicable if the competent authority 
refuses to initiate the MAP from the very beginning.61 Even though Art. 25 of 
the OECD embraces mandatory arbitration, precise arbitration procedure is not 
provided in the model. Rather the model has left it to mutual decision by the 
contracting parties. Therefore, there are individuals who believe that it is 
inefficient to set up rules on ad hoc basis.  
Mandatory arbitration of international tax disputes has been supported by 
some global organizations and NGOs such as the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). For 
instance, in 2000, the ICC Commission on Taxation published a policy 
statement on arbitration in tax matters, which could easily be adopted in 
bilateral tax treaties.62 As compared to the existing MAP and judicial procedures, 
the following three arguments are forwarded in support of arbitration:  
Process finalization argument: It is obvious that arbitration is similar to a 
judicial preceding and differs from the MAP since arbitration results in an award 
which is as good as a court decision.  Because of this attribute, arbitration is said 
to be better than the MAP.63  
Neutrality argument: international tax dispute arbitration is better than the 
MAP because its outcome is based on an independent forum instead of 
interested and biased tax authorities which are expected to give priority to the 
interests of their state.64 Since arbitrators are expected to be independent, they 
can overcome the biased advantage given to the host state which is involved in 
the dispute in different capacities: party, regulator, legislator and adjudicator”.65 
                                           
61 See Farah, cited above at note 60, pp.716, 734-736. 
62 See Limor Riza, cited above at note 51, p.1072. 
63 Gustaf Lindencrona (1994), ‘Recent Development of Tax Treaty Arbitration’, in 
Resolution of Tax Treaty Conflicts by Arbitration 3, 8, p.8. 
64 See generally Barry Bracewell-Milnes (1994), ‘Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar’, 
in Resolution of Tax Treaty, Conflicts by Arbitration 61, 62. 
65 This quotation was mentioned with regard to investment treaty arbitration. See, Susan D. 
Franck (2005), ‘The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under Investment 
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Where the tax dispute involves large-scale trading and financial activities 
conducted by multinational enterprises, each state would work to enhance its 
own interest at the expense of the other state66 in contrast to the non-
involvement of the contracting states in the dispute-resolution process under 
arbitration thereby rendering it more politically and procedurally neutral.67  
Efficiency argument: as compared to the ordinary judicial proceeding, one 
apparent advantage of arbitration is that it saves cost and time because it is free 
from the strict procedural and evidentiary rules. It is also argued that arbitral 
decision is final since the parties cannot lodge appeal against the arbitral award, 
in effect, making arbitration significantly cost effective.68  
The arguments raised against arbitration are: the fairness and confidentiality 
argument, and the sovereignty argument. The fairness and confidentiality 
argument notes that secrecy is the Achilles heel of the arbitration mechanism, 
and lack of transparency is the main drawback of arbitration as compared to 
judicial proceedings. International tax arbitration has been totally obscure from 
the public69 since arbitration process and its final decision are not open. This is 
said to be a fertile ground for corruption when the parties cannot rely the 
process.70  
According to the proponents of the sovereignty argument, arbitration impairs 
sovereignty of states since internal tax revenue decisions are left to the 
resolution of third party arbitrators.71 Because the resolution of international tax 
disputes requires the interpretation of domestic laws, some scholars argue that 







                                                                                                            
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future’, 12 University of California, 
Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 47, 71-72. 
66 Limor Riza, cited above at note 51, p.11. 
67 Park, cited above, at 36.  
68 Ibid 
69 Limor Riza, cited above at note 51, p.12. 
70 Ibid 
71 Farah cited above at note 60, p 709. 
72 Limor Riza, cited above at note 51, p.13. 
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5. The Implication of the Tax Dispute System (Related to DTTs) 
for Developing Countries  
Developing countries have been taking various measures which are thought to 
be instruments towards attracting FDI.73 This includes the bilateral double tax 
treaties (DTTs) signed by developing countries with capital exporting countries 
with the purpose of avoiding international double taxation since double taxation 
is a hindrance to the flow of FDI to such countries.74  
Developing countries enter into DTTs with capital exporting countries using 
either the OECD or the UN Model Tax Convention. In effect, they have adhered 
to the international tax dispute resolution system embodied in Art. 25 of the two 
Model convntions. As discussed in Section 3 (above), the MAP is not 
compulsory. Many developing countries have not been using the MAP as an 
international dispute resolution mechanism although it has been expressly 
included in bilateral tax treaties they have so far signed.75 Since the negotiation 
exercise in MAP is not an easy task, it is advisable for developing countries to 
enhance their negotiating capacity and their competence in the application and 
interpretation of DTTs. 
The use of compulsory arbitration as an international tax dispute resolution 
mechanism has also been seriously questioned on the basis of the UN Model or 
the OECD Model. The two models have some clear differences as far as 
arbitration of international tax disputes is concerned. A close scrutiny of the two 
models reveals that there are four differences between these model tax 
conventions:  
a) The UN model provides that unresolved MAP cases shall be referred to 
arbitration after three years from the commencement of the MAP while the 
OECD model provides that arbitration is to be initiated after two years.76 
This difference is attributable to the intention in the UN model to give a 
                                           
73 See Kangning Xu and Paulo Elicha Tembe (2012), ‘Attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
in Developing Countries: Determinants and Policies: A Comparative Study between 
Mozambique and China’, International Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 3, No. 4; 
2012. 
74 See Julia Braun and Martin Zagler (2014), ‘An Economic Perspective on Double Tax 
Treaties with(in) Developing Countries’, World Tax Journal, October 2014 
75 See Mutual Agreement Procedure -Dispute Avoidance and Resolution, Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, the United Nations, Fourteenth 
Session Geneva, 17-20 October 2017, available at 
www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp.../2017/.../15STM_CRP26_Mutual-Agreement-Procedure.pdf, 
accessed on December 25, 2017. 
76 Compare Art.25 of the UN MTC, which has not contained arbitration with alternative B of 
Art. 25 (5) of the the same document. 
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longer period of time to initiate arbitration owing to resource and capacity 
limitations of developing countries.77  
b) According to the UN Model, arbitration is to be initiated by one of the 
competent authorities rather than by the taxpayer contrary, and this varies 
from what is as provided under the OECD model.78  
c) The UN Model allows competent authorities to depart from the arbitral 
award within six months after the award is handed down where they can 
jointly agree on a different solution. However, under the OECD model, an 
arbitral award is binding, and the competent authorities are bound to 
implement the award.79  
d) Contrary to Art. 25 of the OECD Model, the arbitration clause is only 
included in one of the two alternatives in Art. 25(B) of the UN Model. This 
demonstrates that the UN model’s approach is more cautious since such 
approach is beneficial to developing countries. This is because Art. 25(A) 
does not include an arbitration clause.80  
A fundamental concern thus arises regarding the implication of the 
differences between Art. 25 of the two models as far as arbitration is concerned. 
The differences in the arbitration provisions of the two models have significant 
implications on the special needs and concerns of developing countries. The 
express retention of the MAP under Art. 25(A) of the UN Model without 
arbitration is a clear reflection of the general reluctance of developing countries 
to compulsory and binding arbitration of international tax deputes. The 
reluctance of developing countries to arbitration is attributable to limited 
experience and unfamiliarity with arbitration of tax disputes.  
The other reasons are doubts regarding the neutrality of arbitrators and public 
policy issues related to third party adjudication of such issues. Moreover, the 
potential cost of arbitration and its possible asymmetrical impact on developing 
countries are other reasons that have made these countries reluctant to 
arbitration of international tax disputes. Most importantly, international tax 
dispute arbitration would affect sovereignty of states.81 Countries are generally 
sovereign in their tax affairs. Yet, tax sovereignty cannot be absolute in the era 
                                           
77 See generally Dispute Settlement: Arbitration Issues for Developing Countries and 
Possible Ways Forward, a report produced by Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tenth Session Geneva, the UN, 19-23 October 2015, 
available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/.../2015/10/11STM_CRP8_DisputeResolution.pdf, accessed on Jan. 2, 2017, p.10. 
78 Compare the two articles of the two MTCs. 
79 See the material cited above at note 80, p.10. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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of globalization because the tax sovereignty of a country can be constrained by 
the policies of other countries.82  
In light of the value attached to tax sovereignty, the legal regimes of 
developing countries in general embody constitutional and legal clauses that 
place taxation in the impenetrable realm of sovereignty. Examples in this regard 
include countries where fiscal sovereignty is embedded in the concept of public 
order, sovereign economic policy or the catchall notion of public policy. For 
instance, tax disputes are not submitted to arbitration in Colombia since doing 
so would go against public order. As Kollmann et al observed,83 in Colombia, 
public order refers to precepts that cannot be ignored by particular agreement as 
long as they are pertinent to the state’s public, economic and social interests. 
Likewise, Ecuador’s Arbitration Law embodies a clause which makes it clear 
that sovereignty issues like taxation are excluded from the domain of arbitration. 
Arbitration of tax disputes is not also acceptable in Argentina.84  
Ethiopia has been exerting efforts to attract foreign direct investment as an 
instrument for growth and development. The measures taken by Ethiopia 
towards attracting FDI include signing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
double tax avoidance treaties.85 Because these treaties naturally incorporate 
principles of international taxation –including the source principle and the 
residence principle– international double taxation is inevitable.86 Therefore, 
Ethiopia has taken unilateral measures such as foreign tax crediting and tax 
exemption.87 In addition to the unilateral measures, Ethiopia has signed several 
bilateral double tax avoidance treaties with various countries.  
Close scrutiny of these bilateral tax treaties reveals that Ethiopia has signed 
these bilateral tax treaties in accordance with OECD Model Tax Treaty.88As 
regards international tax dispute resolution, the bilateral tax treaties signed by 
Ethiopia and other countries have incorporated the MAP as it is provided under 
Art. 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This means that Ethiopia has not 
accepted mandatory arbitration as a means to the resolution of international tax 
                                           
82 Id, p.19.  
83 Jasmin Kollmann, Petra Koch, Alicja Majdanska, and Laura Turcan (2013), ‘Arbitration 
in International Tax Matters’, Tax Notes International, Vol.77, No.13, March 2013, p.534. 
84 Id, p.537. 
85 See Martha Belete Hailu and Tilahun Esmael Kassahun (2014), ‘Rethinking Ethiopia’s 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in light of Recent Developments in International Investment 
Arbitration’, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1, September 2014. 
86 See the Ethiopian Federal Income Tax Proclamation of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 
979/2008, Fed. Neg. Gaz., year 22, No.104, Art.7. 
87 Id, Art.45. 
88 In the course of conducting this research work, I have consulted several tax treaties signed 
between Ethiopia and other countries and have realized that the treaties are influenced by 
the OECD MTC. 
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disputes. Ethiopia’s approach towards mandatory international tax dispute 
resolution is the same as the stance taken by developing countries in general 
since there is a fear that mandatory tax arbitration would seriously impair state 
sovereignty with regard to taxation. The domestic tax laws of Ethiopia are also 
cautious because arbitration of tax disputes is not recognized since it is believed 
that it would affect tax sovereignty.89 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In the era of globalization, issues associated with international taxation are 
multifaceted and complex. Issues relating to the resolution of international tax 
disputes are among the most important themes that have attracted the attention 
of international multinational corporations, international organizations, such as 
the OECD and the UN, and individual sovereign countries. To this end, both the 
OECD and the UN have put in place an international dispute resolution 
mechanism called the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). In fact, this 
procedure has been used in international tax disputes by various countries. 
However, the MAP has several defects and disadvantages. Thus, there is the 
need for the improvement of the international tax dispute resolution system 
commensurate with the gaps and complexities in international taxation. To this 
end, both the OECD and the UN have recommended the inclusion of mandatory 
tax dispute arbitration in their Model bilateral tax treaties. However, the aptness 
of the compulsory arbitration has been seriously questioned in spite of some 
strong arguments raised in its favour. Particularly, developing countries are very 
much hesitant about the relevance of arbitration for the resolution of 
international tax disputes arising from DTTs since they believe that it would 
seriously undermine their tax sovereignty. 
As demonstrated in the preceding sections of this note, there is no effective 
and meaningful international tax dispute resolution system that caters for the 
balanced interests and needs of international community. In this regard, special 
interests of developing countries should be taken into account because 
international tax dispute resolution system has significant impact on developing 
countries. To this end, developing countries are expected to enhance their 
benefits from the international tax dispute resolution system by balancing their 
need to attract foreign capital and their inherent tax sovereignty.                       ■ 
                                           
89 In this regard, see, Aschalew Ashagre (2014), ‘የታክስ ከፋዮች ቅሬታ አፈታት ሥርዓት 
በኢትዮጵያ፣’ Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1; and also see, Misganaw Gashaw (2012), 
‘The Room for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Process in Tax Disputes: A 
Message to the Ethiopian Tax Administrations,’ in Yazachew Belew (ed.), The Resolution 
of Commercial/Business Disputes in Ethiopia: Towards Alternatives to Adjudication? 
Ethiopian Business Law Series, Vol. 5. 
